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BAD BYTES: THE APPLICATION OF.
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY TO
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
INTRODUCTION
Computerization is rapidly becoming an essential component
of our functioning society.' This growth in automation has in-
creased the risk that manufacturers and suppliers of software 2 will
be exposed to liability3 when their products fail to perform as ex-
pected.4 Although to date there have been few products liability
cases involving computer software, 5 the frequency of litigation in-
volving other intangibles6 suggests that, as computer use expands,
I See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Abstracts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1981, at 31 (consult-
ant predicts "all executives will eventually be computer-literate"); Sally Reed, Decade's Top
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1985, § 12, at 17 (estimating computer use to multiply ten-fold
over next decade); Robert J. Samuelson, Our Computerized Society, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 9,
1985, at 73 (as many as 10 million home computers in use by 1990).
1 See generally R. LEE HAGELSHAW, THE COMPUTER USER'S LEGAL GUIDE 86-88 (1985)
(defining "software"). Although various definitions exist, in general, "software" is the intan-
gible portion of a computer system which issues a set of instructions to the computer itself.
See id. For purposes of this Note, the terms "computer software" and "computer programs"
are used interchangeably.
' See JOHN C. LAUTSCH, AMERICAN STANDARD HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE LAW 263 (1985)
(computers "will inevitably become a focus of liability"); L. Nancy Birnbaum, Strict Prod-
ucts Liability and Computer Software, 8 COMPUTER/L.J. 135, 144 (1988) (strict liability in-
evitably will be imposed because defective software is capable of producing catastrophes);
David A. Hall, Note, Strict Products Liability and Computer Software: Caveat Vendor, 4
COMPUTER/L.J. 373, 374-75 (1983) (courts have not addressed application of products liabil-
ity to computer programs, but increased computer use makes issue ripe for adjudication).
4 See Susan Lanoue, Comment, Computer Software and Strict Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 439, 440 (1983). Defects in computer programs may occur because an error in pro-
gram instructions took place during copying or because the original program contained some
flaw. Id. "A program malfunctions basically in one of two ways: either it will not run at all,
or it will not run according to its program." Michael C. Gemignani, Product Liability and
Software, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173, 176 (1981).
1 See LAUTSCH, supra note 3, at 263-64; Gary T. Walker, The Expanding Applicability
of Strict Liability Principles: How Is a "Product" Defined?, 22 TORT INS. L.J. 1, 12-13
(1986) (strict liability not yet applied to software); see also Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash
Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 740-41 (D.N.J. 1979) (deciding claim of inoperable com-
puter under Uniform Commercial Code and deeming use of strict liability theory unneces-
sary), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
0 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 585 F. Supp. 739, 744
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products liability actions against software manufacturers will be-
come increasingly common.'
Recently, in Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons,8 the Ninth Circuit
stated in dictum that computer software may be sufficiently tangi-
ble to be considered a "product" for purposes of products liability
law.' This Note will consider whether the Ninth Circuit was cor-
rect in its characterization of computer software. Part One will dis-
cuss the classification of software as a "good" under the Uniform
Commercial Code and examine the approach courts have taken in
determining the applicability of the Code to cases involving
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (liability may exist for incorrect information since insurance policy made no
distinction between physical instruction manual and its intellectual content). Charts con-
taining instrument approach information for aircraft or topographical information have
been held to be products subject to products liability. See infra note 71 and accompanying
text; see also RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY I 7.06[2][b], at 7-26
(1985) (analogizing software to aeronautical charts). See generally Andrew T. Bayman,
Note, Strict Liability for Defective Ideas in Publications, 42 VAND. L. REV. 557 passim
(1989) (discussing policies underlying application of strict liability to publications).
' Cf. JOSEPH P. ZAMMIT & MARIA A. SAVIO, TORT LIABILITY FOR HIGH RISK COMPUTER
SOFTWARE 1 (1987). "We are faced with the increasing likelihood that cases involving 'mal-
functioning' computer software causing bodily injuries and property damage will be before
our courts." Id.
938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
9 Id. at 1035-36. The plaintiffs in Winter became severely ill after consuming poisonous
mushrooms described in The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms as edible. Id. at 1034. Because
the expressions and ideas contained in the book were deemed intangible and "[p]roducts
liability law is geared to the tangible world," id., the Ninth Circuit held that the publisher
could not be held liable under a products liability theory for information contained in the
book. Id. at 1036. However, the court suggested that "[clomputer software that fails to yield
the result for which it was designed may ... [constitute a product]." Id. In support of its
decision, the court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides the following:
The rule stated in this Section is not limited to the sale of food for human con-
sumption, or other products for intimate bodily use, although it will obviously
include them. It extends to any product sold in the condition, or substantially the
same condition, in which it is expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer.
Thus the rule stated applies to an automobile, a tire, an airplane, a grinding
wheel, a water heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a chair, and an
insecticide. It applies also to products which, if they are defective, may be ex-
pected to and do cause only "physical harm" in the form of damage to the user's
land or chattels, as in the case of animal food or a herbicide.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Regarding the court's remarks on computer software, software law expert Michael A.
Epstein stated, "'It's not the holding; it's dicta. But, in any event, for the court to come
down and signal its acquiescence for the development of the law in this direction is substan-
tial.'" Victoria Slind-Flor, Supplier Pulls Software-Ruling's Dicta Causes Uproar, NAT'L
L.J., July 29, 1991, at 3. The significance of the court's statement was demonstrated when a
computer software supplier temporarily withdrew its products from the market in response
to this dictum. Id.
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software. Part Two will focus on products liability law and the
question of whether computer software constitutes a "product."
Part Three will consider the potential impact of strict products lia-
bility on the computer industry and the First Amendment issues
raised by the imposition of this type of liability. Finally, Part Four
will suggest a fact-specific, policy-oriented approach for determin-
ing whether strict products liability theory should be applied to
computer software.
I. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF SOFTWARE UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
As computer use has become widespread, the public increas-
ingly has encountered software malfunctions, or "bugs,"' 0 which
can cause property damage or even bodily injury." When a mal-
function occurs, the characterization of software as either a good or
a service is critical to determining what, if any, contractual liability
may be incurred by the manufacturers and suppliers of software.
12
,o See JAMES V. VERGARI & VIRGINIA V. SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER-HIGH
TECHNOLOGY LAW 601 (1991). A "bug" is "[a]n error or malfunction in a computer program.
Such errors can range from barely detectible quirks to fatal flaws." Id.
Debugging software is an arduous task that continues even after the program has been
introduced into the marketplace. See Hall, supra note 3, at 396. Because the creation of
software programs is a complicated process, "it is just about impossible ever to debug a
program completely." See Roy N. Freed, Products Liability in the Computer Age, 17
JURIMETRICS J. 270, 275 (1976); see also Pezzillo v. General Tel. & Elec. Info. Sys., 414 F.
Supp. 1257, 1265 (M.D. Tenn. 1976) (roughly 80% of programmer's time devoted to debug-
ging), aff'd, 572 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1978); Gemignani, supra note 4, at 185 (no level of
testing can ensure that program is completely debugged). Thus, even the most rigorous
software examinations can result in a program that malfunctions. Id.
" See, e.g., Scott v. White Trucks, 699 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1983) (case involving
failure of electronic anti-lock brakes); Ed Joyce, Software Bugs: A Matter of Life and Lia-
bility, DATAMATION, May 15, 1987, at 88 (recognizing software malfunction as cause of seri-
ous injury and death to cancer patients receiving computerized therapeutic radiation treat-
ment); Steve Lohr, New in Japan: The Manless Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1981, § 3, at
1 (factory worker crushed to death by industrial robot); see also Tom Henkel, NASA Jum-
bles Skylab Flight Data, COMPUTERWORLD, July 9, 1979, at 1 (Skylab's on-board computers
unable to regulate incorrect flight parameters, causing vehicular "wobble"); Marguerite
Zientara, CPU Fails, Two Jets Nearly Collide, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 12, 1979, at 1 (com-
puter failure resulted in near collision of aircraft).
" See, e.g., Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note, Computer Software as a Good Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REV.
129, 130 (1985) (U.C.C. provisions apply to software classified as "goods"); infra note 17 and
accompanying text.
If a court determines that a defendant software manufacturer was providing a service,
the plaintiff will be forced to rely on negligence principles, requiring a demonstration that
(1) the defendant had a duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty owed to the plaintiff, (3)
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This is because contracts involving "transactions in goods'' 3 are
subject to the provisions of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, while those involving services are not.14 If a court concludes
that a software transaction is subject to the Code, the manufac-
turer and supplier may be held liable for breach of the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose. 5 However,
because computer software contains both tangible and intangible
properties, its classification as either a good or a service is
problematic."1
Several courts considering the characterization of software
have held that computer programs are goods for purposes of the
this act or omission was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and (4) that the plain-
tiff was indeed harmed. See LAUTSCH, supra note 3, at 227.
" U.C.C. § 2-102.
" See id. ("unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in
goods"). "Goods" are defined under the Code as "all things ... which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract other than money ... , investment securities and
things in action." Id. § 2-105(1). See generally Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853 (1986) (discussing
application of U.C.C. to software).
," See U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -315. Section 2-314 states in relevant part: "Unless excluded
or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Id. § 2-314.
Merchantability with respect to software means, inter alia, that the program is fit for the
ordinary purposes for which it is to be used. Id. § 2-314(2)(c). Section 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgement to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless ex-
cluded or modified ...an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
Id. § 2-315..
However, it should be noted that § 2-316(2) allows the Code's implied warranties to be
modified or excluded from the transaction altogether, thus potentially limiting or eliminat-
ing liability for breach of such warranties. See id. § 2-316(2).
" See Kerry M.L. Smith, Comment, Suing the Provider of Computer Software: How
Courts Are Applying U.C.C. Article Two, Strict Tort Liability, and Professional Malprac-
tice, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 743, 747-51 (1988). Although computer software contains both
tangible and intangible components, the "intangible program" generally is considered the
primary function of all software because the tangible object embodied by the program is
useless without the intangible commands that make the software work. See Horovitz, supra
note 12, at 132-33 ("The medium should not be confused with the message."). Contra Ad-
vent Sys. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991) (focusing on "tangib[ility]" and
"moveab[ility]" of programs contained in physical mediums). The Third Circuit noted that
the computer program, like music or literature, is an intellectual product, and like these
other literary works, can become "goods" once embodied in a physical medium. Id. How-
ever, the professional expertise employed in software creation arguably warrants the classifi-
cation of software as services. See Walker, supra note 5, at 12-13.
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Uniform Commercial Code.17 As early as 1985, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that the sale of software packages could constitute a
sale of goods. 18 However, the court also recognized that the nature
of software requires a fact-specific analysis of the essence of the
transaction in order to determine whether, in any given case,
software is primarily a good or a service.19 Courts faced with this
issue have concentrated on "whether the goods aspect or the ser-
vice aspect predominated, ' 20 rather than simply looking to the
physical attributes of the software itself.21 In making this determi-
nation, certain variables have consistently been recognized by
courts. If, for example, software is provided along with a corre-
sponding hardware package, it is more likely to be considered a
sale of goods,2 2 but similar transactions that include custom pro-
gramming have been characterized as services.23
,7 See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 742-43 (2d Cir.
1979) (hardware included with computer system rendered "essence of contract sale of
goods"); Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.N.J. 1979)
(lease agreement for hardware/software was "sale of goods" subject to U.C.C.), afl'd, 635
F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); Analysts Int'l Corp. v. Recycled Paper Prods., Inc., No. 85 C 8637,
1987 WL 12917, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (custom software qualified as goods since any other
interpretation rendered contract useless). But see Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith
Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that contract for sale of
software created for specific customer, unaccompanied by sale of hardware, was contract for
services).
RRX Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985).
'9 Id. The court, noting that the nature of "software . . .var[ies] depending on the
needs of the individual consumer," found the underlying transaction to be a sale of goods
because the services provided with the software were only "incidental" to the sale of the
program. Id.
20 Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 438 (Md. 1983) (quoting GEORGE I. WAL-
LACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11.05[3], at 11-28 (1981))
(describing predominant purpose test applied to mixed or hybrid transactions).
" JOHN M. CONLEY, NON-CONTRACT THEORIES OF RECOVERY AGAINST VENDORS OF DE-
FECTIVE SOFTWARE 3 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 230, 1986) ("courts have focused ... on whether the transfer of goods
or the provision of a service is at the heart of the contract"); see also supra note 17 (cases
applying predominant purpose test to software).
22 See supra note 17.
23 See, e.g., Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318-19
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (custom software represented programmer's skill and was thus part of
contract for services); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988) (custom programming rendered contract one for services). In Data Processing Servs.,
the court emphasized that "[t]he sale of computer hardware or generally available standard-
ized software was not ... involved." Data Processing Servs., 492 N.E.2d at 319.
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II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW AND SOFTWARE
A. Is Software a "Product" for Purposes of Strict Liability?
Just as article 2 applies only to "transactions in goods," '24
strict products liability under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts ("Restatement") applies only to "products. '25
Although courts have repeatedly held software to be a "good"
within the purview of the Uniform Commercial Code, they have
not yet directly addressed the issue of whether software is a "prod-
uct" under the Restatement.2 6 Some commentators have simply
taken for granted that if software is a "good," it must necessarily
be a "product. 2 7 However, because these words are terms of art
used by the Code and the Restatement, this assumption may not
be valid.2s Instead, it is helpful to compare the analyses used by
courts in interpreting both the Code and the Restatement for clas-
2, U.C.C. § 2-102; see also supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text (discussing appli-
cability of Uniform Commercial Code to "transactions in goods").
21 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A(1); see Hall, supra note 3, at 375; Lanoue, supra
note 4, at 447 n.37. Traditionally, strict products liability has been applied only in situations
involving defective products. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d
Cir. 1968). "Professional services do not ordinarily lend themselves to [strict products liabil-
ity] because they lack the elements which gave rise to the doctrine." Id.; see also W. PAGE
KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 104, at 720 (5th ed. 1984)
(product use overlap with service provided, primary problem applying strict liability to
services).
26 See supra note 5.
27 See, e.g., CONLEY, supra note 21, at 20 (concern that software may not be a product
for purposes of strict products liability "seems misplaced, given the tendency to treat
software as goods for Uniform Commercial Code purposes"); Walker, supra note 5, at 9
("software may be considered a product, since it ... may be classified as a good").
Because the words "good" and "product" are often used interchangeably in common
speech, it is arguable that the distinction is purely semantical. The dictionary defines a
product as "a thing produced by labor" and "the totality of goods ma[de] available." THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1544 (Stuart B. Flexner et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1987); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A cmt. c (1965) (noting interchange-
able use of "goods" and "products"). The Restatement, discussing the justifications for the
imposition of strict liability, states that
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who
may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case
of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that
reputable sellers will stand by their goods.
Id. (emphasis added).
28 See ZAMMIT & SAVIO, supra note 7, at 2-3. "[I]t does not necessarily follow that be-
cause software is viewed as goods for commercial law purposes, it should be viewed as a
product for personal injury or property damages purposes." Id.
BAD BYTES
sifying items which have tangible and intangible qualities. 29
As previously discussed, courts considering whether software
should be classified as a good for purposes of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code look to the essence of the transaction or its predomi-
nant purpose.3 0 Under this so-called "dominant thrust" analysis,31
a major consideration is whether the contract was primarily for the
programmer's knowledge and skill or for the tangible medium that
stores the information. 2 Under this approach, a program that is
made-to-order is more likely to be considered a service than one
that is mass-produced. 3 A similar approach has been taken by
courts under strict products liability theory in cases involving
mixed or hybrid transactions.3 4 Courts look to the facts to deter-
mine whether the bargain was entered into primarily for the skills
of the programmer or for the software itself.3 5 In applying this test
to computer software, the determinant factor would probably be
21 See id. at 3 (analogizing cases involving characterization under the Restatement and
characterization under the Code for hybrid transactions).
30 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
"I Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986).
.2 See id. at 319 (concluding custom-made software is a service because "[wihile a tan-
gible end product ... may be involved incidentally. . ., it is the skill and knowledge of the
programmer which is being purchased in the main").
31 See, e.g., L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d at 318-19 (custom program held to be
contract for services not subject to Code); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97,
100 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (custom computer programming contract considered contract for
services under Code).
" See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
3' See John J. Fossett, The Development of Negligence in Computer Law, 14 N. Ky. L.
REv. 289, 307 (1987). Several variables are considered in determining whether or not
software is a "product" against which strict products liability may be applied. Id. "Of cen-
tral importance to this determination is whether the seller or manufacturer of the product
has employed mass-marketing techniques (e.g., mass production, large-scale distribution of
finished products, and mass market advertising) ... ." Id. However, the courts' reluctance to
impose products liability against mass-produced publications demonstrates that mass-mar-
keting is not necessarily determinative. See Bayman, supra note 6, at 564-69. This is true
even though the publications probably reach far more purchasers. Id.
For early computers to function properly, custom programs developed by experts were
necessary; their use was thus an expensive undertaking. See Ronald N. Weikers, Comment,
"Computer Malpractice" and Other Legal Problems Posed by Computer "Vaporware", 33
VILL. L. Rav. 835, 871-73 (1988). However, technological advances revolutionized software,
transforming it from a system-dependant component part to a distinct product capable of
functioning in conjunction with many different computer systems. Id. This opened the door
to the "mass-market[ing]" of "canned software" which changed the characterization of com-
puter programs from a mere component part of a specific system to "a product that is dis-
tinct from the computer hardware in which it is used." Id. at 873-74.
1992]
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"the form of the software or the manner in which it is marketed. 36
Thus, software that is produced in large quantities is more likely
to be considered a product than that which is custom-made.37
Given the similarities between these two analyses and the common
factors that have been emphasized by the courts, it is suggested
that software which passes as a "good" under the Code would also
be considered a "product" under the Restatement.
Additionally, it is interesting to note that the damages already
available to an aggrieved buyer under the Uniform Commercial
Code are comparable to those available under strict products lia-
bility theory." Section 2-715 of the Code specifies that a buyer
should be allowed to recover for "injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty. ' 39 Two com-
ments to the Code indicate that what must be proved in an action
based on breach of warranty is comparable to that which must be
proved under the Restatement.40
B. Application of Strict Products Liability
Assuming that software is classified as a product, strict prod-
ucts liability for software sold in a defective or unreasonably dan-
gerous condition may be imposed upon a seller or manufacturer,
but only if the software reached the consumer without substantial
change,41 the consumer used the software in a reasonable fashion,42
" ZAMMIT & SAVIO, supra note 7, at 2-3.
31 See id. at 3.
'8 See CONLEY, supra note 21, at 4 (damages available under the Code comparable to
those of other tort theories).
'9 See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (emphasis added).
40 Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402(A) (1965) with U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 13
and id. § 2-715 cmt. 5.
4 1 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A. The Restatement provides the following:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without. substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id. Strict products liability in tort had its genesis in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962), which announced that strict liability would exist when a man-
[Vol. 66:469
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and personal injury or property damage was actually caused by the
software.43 Defective computer software may result from the man-
ufacturing process, the failure to warn of the dangers involved in
its use, or the flawed design of the software.44
The- first of these defects, the manufacturing defect, is the
most easily detected because a program that does not conform to
the manufacturer's specifications can be readily discovered through
careful monitoring of the manufacturing process. 46  The second
type of defect, the failure to warn of the dangers involved in the
use of software, seems to be within the complete control of the
manufacturer; 46 however, ensuring that warnings are conspicuous
ufacturer "places [a product] on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspec-
tion for defects [and] proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Id. The
plaintiff was injured by a power tool, and the court held that proof that he was injured using
the product for its intended purpose was enough to demonstrate that it was "unsafe." Id. at
901; see also James T. Murray, Jr., Comment, The State of the Art Defense in Strict Prod-
ucts Liability, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 649, 653 (1974) (product defective if unsafe for normal
use).
4. See Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and
Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93, 95-105 (1972) (manufacturer or supplier not liable
when injury resulted from abnormal use of product); see also W. Page Keeton, Manufac-
turer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20
SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 563 (1969) (plaintiff must demonstrate injury not caused by plain-
tiff's own "misuse").
" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A (1); see also Richard Raysman & Peter
Brown, Strict Product Liability for Software and Data, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 1988, at 3-4.
Generally, recovery in strict products liability can be had only for bodily injury or property
damage, not for pure economic loss. Id.; Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 140.
In Champeau v. Fruehauf Corp., 814 F.2d 1271, 1277-78 (8th Cir. 1987), the court held
that the plaintiff failed to establish causation and therefore declined to impose liability on
the manufacturer of a computer-assisted antilock braking system. Id.; see also Murray,
supra note 41, at 653 (product defect, which at very least is contributory cause of harm, is
threshold requirement for cause of action in strict liability). See generally MICHAEL D.
SCOTT, COMPUTER LAW § 7.12 (1985) (discussing strict liability).
4 See KEETON ET AL, supra note 25, § 99, at 694-98; see also Fluor Corp. v. Jeppeson &
Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("defect" encompasses several "injury-pro-
ducing deficiencies").
'" See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984) (in case of "manufac-
turing defect," product may be evaluated against manufacturer's own production stan-
dards); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983) (if "injury-causing product"
fails to conform to similar standards of manufacturer, it is defective); Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1035-36 (Or. 1974) (because allegedly defective product may be
compared to similar products of manufacturer, manufacturing defect "relatively simple to
identify"); see also Diane B. Lawrence, Strict Liability Computer Software and Medicine:
Public Policy at the Crossroads, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 9-10 (1987).
40 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A cmt. j. The Restatement provides that
"[w]here warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded;
and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defec-
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:469
may be a more difficult task than at first appears. Computer
software is integrated into many products and often is not appar-
ent to the user;47 thus warnings accompanying the software may
easily be overlooked. 4s The third type of defect is that which oc-
curs in the design of the software itself.4 9 A design may be defec-
tive if it is dangerous beyond the contemplation of an ordinary
consumer possessing ordinary knowledge or if its danger outweighs
its utility."
A number of arguments may be made in favor of applying
strict products liability to computer software." If it is held inappli-
cable, plaintiffs would be forced to rely on negligence principles.2
This would give software manufacturers added protection from lia-
bility by dramatically increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof. 53
In fact, case law reveals that plaintiffs have rarely been successful
in negligence actions against computer manufacturers.5 4
Because strict liability is often imposed upon manufacturers of
the mechanical parts of malfunctioning products, it seems inconsis-
tive condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Id. Thus, there are situations where an
adequate warning removes a product from strict liability since the requisite defect or danger
is lacking. See Murray, supra note 41, at 657-58.
47 See Fossett, supra note 35, at 289 (noting many uses of computer programs); Lanoue,
supra note 4, at 448. It may be particularly difficult to perceive potential dangers associated
with "an industrial process .. .not underst[oo]d." Id.; see also Hall, supra note 3, at 374
(computers even permeate games and "special effects").
4" See Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 139, 150. Simply adding warning labels may not be
sufficient if consumers would not read them. Id. at 139. A warning in a users' manual may
also be inadequate because "it is commonly known that many software users do not read
users' manuals." Id.
" See Stephen R. Brenneman, Computer Malfunctions-What Damages May Be Re-
covered in a Tort Product Liability Action, 2 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
271, 279 (1986). When softwaie functions improperly, approximately half of the mistakes
"are the result of defects in design." Id. Imposing strict liability for lingering design defects
in a line of software could cripple software manufacturers because these defects endure be-
yond a program's introduction into the marketplace. See Lawrence, supra note 45, at 15
(strict liability may drive medical software manufacturers out of business).
1° See KEETON ET AL, supra note 25, § 99, at 698-700. Much of the difficulty in products
liability centers around the meaning of the term "design defect." Id. at 698.
" See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
2 See Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 145-46 (discussing negligence standard applied to
computer software).
5 Id. "This burden would include finding the mistake in thousands of electronic bits
.Id. at 146; see also Lanoue, supra note 4, at 448. Even a knowledgeable user could
find it nearly impossible "to isolate the specific act of negligence" that caused the harm. Id.
" See Lawrence B. Levy & Suzanne Y. Bell, Software Product Liability: Understand-
ing and Minimizing the Risks, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 9 (1990); see also CONLEY, supra note
21, at 10 ("negligence theories are of no use in computer cases").
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tent and fundamentally unfair to allow manufacturers of the same
product's defective software components to be held only to a negli-
gence standard.5 5 Moreover, some commentators have asserted
that imposing strict liability on manufacturers profiting from
software sales would help provide incentive for ensuring the safety
of computer programs. 6
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Detrimental Effects of Imposing Strict Liability on the Com-
puter Industry
Initially, public policy appears to warrant the imposition of
strict liability to computer software.57 However, applying strict
products liability against software manufacturers may have "far
reaching implications" for our computerized society.5 8 Because the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions is irrelevant in strict
liability, software manufacturers would in effect be compelled to
guarantee the safety of their programs.59 This increased exposure
to liability would cause insurance companies to raise their premi-
ums, resulting in costlier computer programs.6 0 Increased insurance
rates could inhibit the development of innovative software be-
cause, with insurance costs on established products currently esca-
lating to rates as high as 1500% per year, it seems unlikely that
11 See Lanoue, supra note 4, at 449. For example, "[i]t would be undesirable to permit
an injured consumer to collect under strict products liability for a defective steering mecha-
nism, but not for a defective computer program in the car which may have caused the same
injuries." Id.
06 See Smith, supra note 16, at 759; see also LAUTSCH, supra note 3, at 264 (imposition
of strict liability on software will "compel designers and manufacturers of commercial goods
to design their products with the safety of the user in mind"); Birnbaum, supra note 3, at
143 (strict liability promotes product safety).
17 See Lanoue, supra note 4, at 447-49 (applying strict liability policies to software).
See generally Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 145-50 (justifications underlying imposition of
strict liability to software).
68 See Walker, supra note 5, at 14.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402A (2)(a); see also Birnbaum, supra note 3, at
140 ("liability is absolute").
60 See Walker, supra note 5, at 1 (higher insurance costs result in increased prices and
manufacturing stoppage); Frank Lowenstein, Software Liability; Should Software Publish-
ers Be Liable for Bugs?, TECH. REv., Jan. 1987, at 9-10 (cost of liability "not built into
software pricing"); Jill Andresky et al., A World Without Insurance?, FORBES, July 15, 1985,
at 40 (tremendous premium increases for greatly reduced coverage). The increase in prod-
ucts liability actions has caused an insurance crisis that may lead to widespread unavailabil-
ity of insurance, a "chilling prospect." Id. at 43.
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manufacturers of high-risk or new products would be able to ob-
tain or afford the necessary insurance coverage.61
The application of strict liability in this area may force pro-
ducers of beneficial technology out of business entirely because of
the fear of potential liability 2 and the burdens of defending
claims.6 In fact, one software supplier has already withdrawn some
of its products from the market for fear of potential litigation. 4
The effect of compelling software manufacturers to follow the lead
of manufacturers of medical equipment, vaccines, and drugs in
ceasing production of beneficial products to avoid potential liabil-
ity would be unfortunate. 5 If the makers of products considered
safe are forced to retreat from the marketplace, it appears that
new or experimental products have little hope of survival.66 Thus,
although the merits of applying strict liability are in many cases
unquestionable, it is submitted that the costs of imposing strict
products liability against software manufacturers may at times far
outweigh the benefits.6 7
"' See Michael Brody, When Products Turn into Liabilities, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1986, at
20, 22.
62 See id. at 22. In the medical technology industry, for example, some manufacturers
of medical equipment, vaccines, and drugs, fearing liability, have already ceased production
of these beneficial products. Of all the manufacturers that were producing the vaccines re-
quired for school children, only one company continues to manufacture the combination
measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine. Id.
". Id. at 20. Even manufacturers who have consistently prevailed against strict liability
claims have found the legal fees associated with defending the claims too much to bear. For
example, G.D. Searle & Co. ceased selling its "Copper 7" and "Tatum T" intrauterine de-
vices in the United States because, although these products were considered 'the safest...
on the market,' insurance coverage became unavailable. Id. Moreover, despite Searle's victo-
ries in eight lawsuits, the legal costs for four of the suits accounted for nearly 14% of the
company's sales for 1985. Id.
The "most dramatic" results of products liability claims are the bankruptcies of A.H.
Robins, manufacturer of the poorly designed "Dalkon Shield," and Manville Corporation,
which was buried by an avalanche of asbestos claims. Id.
6 See Slind-Flor, supra note 9, at 3.
65 See Walker, supra note 5, at 15 (application of products liability law to emerging
products "may be too ... [much] for the commercial system to bear"); see also supra note
62 (strict products liability may have adverse effect on medical technology industry).
6 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
6 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. "The prospect of paying out huge
judgments is all companies need to tip the balance against staying in the business. If those
that remain were to raise prices enough to cover potential liabilities, the [products] ... they
make could become prohibitively expensive." Brody, supra note 61, at 22.
Potential products liability actions also impact the corporate policies of companies who
remain in the manufacturing business. See Peter H. Hickok, Owner Says Product Liability
Is "Killing" His Company, NORTHEAST PA. Bus. J., Jan. 1992, at 5. A survey found that
based on products liability concerns, 25% of Pennsylvania manufacturing companies with-
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C. Defective Information: First Amendment Concerns
Over the past two decades, courts began to address the issue
of the applicability of strict products liability when injury is
caused by defective information. 8 Although manufacturers have
attempted to avoid this type of liability by claiming they merely
provided a service, 69 courts have at times allowed such recovery by
focusing on the nature of the defective information, its intended
use, and the resultant injury in order to determine whether or not
the information is a product.10
In fact, courts considering analogous cases have held that in-
tangible information embodied in a physical medium is a product
held new products from the market. Id. Further, another 24% ceased production of existing
products, 9% laid-off employees, and 3% shut-down or moved their operations abroad. Id.
's See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 585 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.
I1. 1983). This negligence action was based on incorrect information contained in a power
saw instruction manual. Id. at 744. The court rejected the insurance company's argument
that the instruction manual consisted of two separate products, namely the tangible book
and its intellectual content. Id. But see Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.) (distinguishing between physical and intellectual properties of book), cert. denied,
353 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1977). In Cardozo, a book vendor was not liable to a cookbook pur-
chaser for injuries resulting from the use of poisonous.ingredients listed in a recipe. Id. at
1053. The court noted that although books are "goods" within the scope of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the thoughts and ideas contained therein are not. Id. at 1055-56. Thus,
while the tangible properties of the book were impliedly warranted, the intellectual content
was not. Id.
11 See, e.g., Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 789-91 (D. Conn. 1982) aff'd
subnom. Soloomy v. Jeppensen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983). The manufacturer ar-
gued that the true nature of the defective charts was simply a communication of informa-
tion, which is a service transaction not subject to strict liability. Id. at 789. However, the
court concluded that differentiating between a product and a service was merely an exercise
in "semantics" because "there is an element of service in all 'goods'." Id.
70 See Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). In
Fluor, a plane crashed into a hill not designated on an instrument approach chart killing all
the passengers that were on board. Id. Although the actual physical attributes of the charts
were harmless, the court analyzed the effects of the defective information and could not
imagine anything "with more inherent lethal potential." Id. at 71; see also Walker, supra
note 5, at 13-15 (magnitude of harm may serve as additional incentive to sway courts to
impose strict liability). The Fluor court determined that classifying the charts as "products"
satisfied the primary policy basis behind strict liability: "'the protection of otherwise de-
fenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading throughout society of the cost
of compensating them.'" Fluor, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (citation omitted).
Courts have also focused upon the intended use or purpose of defective information in
making their determination as to the application of strict liability. See Walter v. Bauer, 439
N.Y.S.2d 821, 822-23 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1981), modified, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (4th Dep't
1982). In Bauer, a student injured while performing a textbook science experiment could
not recover in strict liability. Id. The book was not considered "a defective product" since
the plaintiff was not injured by use of the book for its intended purpose--"to be read." Id.
at 822.
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subject to strict products liability. 71 This line of cases is particu-
larly relevant to the analysis of strict liability and software because
computer programs generally "either contain[] information or as-
sist[] in the generation or manipulation of information. 72
However, because computer software is often a vehicle for dis-
seminating information, the application of strict liability in this
context may violate the First Amendment.73 For this reason, most
jurisdictions have declined to hold distributors of other forms of
information strictly liable. 4 In fact, no court has extended strict
liability to the distribution of ideas or information physically em-
bodied in books or other publications.75 Reasoning that the pros-
pect of strict liability would "chill expression" and be "inconsistent
with free speech principles, 71 6 courts generally separate the physi-
cal properties of the medium from the information contained
" See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294-95 (9th Cir.) (publisher of
instrument approach procedures strictly liable for injuries caused by defective chart), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1985); Saloomey v. Jeppeson & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir.
1983) (mass-produced navigational charts are products); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Jep-
peson & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1981) (products liability applies to publisher of
defective instrument approach charts); Fluor, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (aeronautical charts are
products).
The basis of liability in these cases was an analogy of the charts to other tools of navi-
gation, which, if defective, created a substantial risk of harm. See Jones v. J.B. Lippincott
Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988); see also Winter, 938 F.2d at 1036 (analogizing
aeronautical charts to compass and computer software, both geared to yield specific results).
Computer programs may similarly be viewed as highly technical instruments, capable of
causing great injury, if defective. See Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 127 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(complex materials adopt qualities of "product[s]"), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991).
72 Levy & Bell, supra note 54, at 6; see also NIMMER, supra note 6, 7.06[2][b], at 7-26
(software may be characterized as information).
71 See Bayman, supra note 6, at 576. "imposing strict liability on writers and publishers
under products liability law effectively would nullify ... constitutional constraints .... " Id.
74 See, e.g., Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217-18 (D. Md. 1988)
(publisher not liable for nursing student's injurious self treatment with medical textbook
remedy); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803-04 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (pub-
lisher not liable for deaths resulting from practice of 'autoerotic asphyxiation' explained in
article entitled 'Orgasm of Death'); Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822-23 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1981) (plaintiff injured performing science experiment described in textbook; court
considered "chilling effect" on free speech that would have resulted from application of
strict liability), modified, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (4th Dep't 1982); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123,
126-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (no publisher liability when reader following The Last Chance
Diet died from complications), af'd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1991); see also Cardozo, 342 So. 2d
at 1053 (cookbook vendor not liable for injuries caused by poisonous ingredients listed in
recipe).
75 See Lippincott, 694 F. Supp. at 1217; Linn, 563 A.2d at 126-27.
71 See Lippincott, 694 F. Supp. at 1217; see also Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 823
(Sup. Ct. Erie County 1981), Modified, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (4th Dep't 1981).
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therein.7" In Winter,8 for instance, the Ninth Circuit rejected a
products liability claim against the publisher of a reference guide
to mushrooms that misidentified poisonous varieties of the fungus
as edible.7 9 Granting summary judgment to the defendant, the
court stated that the "book [contained] pure thought and expres-
sion" and was not subject to products liability.80 Thus, although
allocating the costs of injuries resulting from erroneous informa-
tion is an appealing concept, courts recognizing "the high priority
[placed] on the unfettered exchange of ideas" are reluctant to ap-
ply strict products liability in this context."' Because of this reluc-
tance, courts may determine that applying strict products liability
to information supplied through computer software creates too
great a burden on First Amendment protections."2
IV. SUGGESTED APPROACH
In deciding whether strict products liability should be applied
in any given case involving software, courts should be mindful of
the far reaching effects of their decisions.83 The widespread appli-
cation of strict products liability to cases involving defective
software could have a crippling effect on technology and on the
computer industry as a whole. 4 Furthermore, because computer
programs are media used for the dissemination of ideas and infor-
mation, the imposition of strict liability could conflict with estab-
lished constitutional protections of speech under the First Amend-
" Lippincott, 694 F. Supp. at 1217; see also Winter, 938 F.2d at 1034 (distinguishing
"thoughts" from "substance"); Cardozo, 342 So. 2d at 1056 (differentiating between physical
elements of books and ideas within).
78 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
79 Id. at 1033-34.
80 Id. at 1036. The court further held that because a publisher is under no duty to
verify intellectual content, the plaintiffs' negligence action also failed. Id. at 1036-37.
"' Id. at 1035. The court acknowledged that strict liability's effect of inhibiting the de-
velopment of new products is more acceptable than the potential loss of "the latest ideas
and theories." Id.
The concept of applying First Amendment protection to computer programs is not out-
landish; computer output has already been analogized to a person's "written expression of
ideas." Bayman, supra note 6, at 576. Further, software that is able to imitate human think-
ing processes already exists. See Steven J. Frank, Tort Adjudication and the Emergence of
Artificial Intelligence Software, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 623, 624, 640-41 nn.71-75 (1987); see
also Freed, supra note 10, at 280 (computer output compared to "human information
processing").
82 See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
83 See Walker, supra note 5, at 14.
"' See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
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ment.8 5 In light of this potential conflict, it is suggested that courts
employ a three-step analysis when determining whether strict
products liability is appropriate for injuries arising from defective
software.
The initial step in this analysis is to determine whether the
computer program should be characterized as a "product" within
the meaning of the Restatement.86 If the software is found to be a
service, rather than a product, the strict liability claim should be
dismissed. Alternatively, if the software is found to be a product,
the second step in the analysis would be to determine whether the
expression of ideas or information contained in the program is en-
titled to First Amendment protections.8 7 If the information is not
constitutionally protected, the final inquiry would be an examina-
tion of the policies underlying strict products liability law coupled
with a balancing of the risks of the software's use against its bene-
ficial purposes to determine whether the application of this type of
liability is appropriate in the particular case. S These policies in-
clude (1) allocating risk to those most able to protect themselves,8 9
(2) compensating for injury, 0 (3) alleviating the evidentiary bur-
den of proving negligence, 9' (4) compensating for a purchaser's in-
ability to inspect and his or her consequent reliance on the manu-
facturer's expertise, 2 and (5) discouraging the marketing of
" See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § § 12-1 to 12-39, at 785-1061 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
freedom of speech under the First Amendment).
" See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
" See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring). The cost of injury may be overwhelming to an injured person, and this alloca-
tion of risk places the financial burden on the manufacturer, who is better equipped to
afford it. Id. The basis for "cost-spreading" is that the manufacturer has the ability to in-
sure the product against injury and to pass the expenses along to "the public as a cost of
doing business." Id.; see also John. W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973) (manufacturers distribute costs to consumers
through pricing).
o See Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 143; KEETON ET AL, supra note 44, § 1, at 5.
See Smith, supra note 16, at 755; see also Wade, supra note 82, at 825-26 (difficulties
in proving negligence is primary consideration behind strict liability). See generally Susan
Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 1, 15-16 (1979) (discussing principal justifications for strict liability).
"z See Lawrence, supra note 45, at 11 ("superior knowledge" enables manufacturer to
detect and remove defects); see also Fossett, supra note 35, at 306 (strict liability is imposed
on party best able discern and remove defects).
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defective products." Under this flexible, fact-specific analysis, if a
court determines that the policies weigh in favor of strict liability,
relief should be granted to the injured party.9 4
CONCLUSION
With the expanding presence of computers in our society, in-
juries to persons and property due to software malfunction are cer-
tain to occur with greater frequency. As a result, courts inevitably
must consider whether strict products liability should be imposed
upon the manufacturers and suppliers of defective computer pro-
grams. Because computer technology has not yet evolved to the
point where software can be made completely safe, utilization of
the suggested three-step analysis would provide predictability and
help ensure even application of the law. Until a greater level of
certainty in computer design can be achieved, the use of this bal-
ancing test will encourage manufacturers to develop safer products
while limiting the potentially adverse impact on emerging benefi-
cial technology.
Lori A. Weber
9' See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441. Additional policy justifications exist for imposing strict
liability. See generally Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 467 P.2d 256, 261-62 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1970) (enumerating policies underlying strict liability).
"' Bayman, supra note 6, at 562-63. Flexible application of strict liability is important
because in many situations, the court's determination enormously affects innovation, and
may in fact "determine whether a given product or industry survives." Id.
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